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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-1842 
_____________ 
 
EDDIE WILSON,  
 
                     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION;  
WARDEN JONATHAN C. MINER 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(Civil Action No. 4:06-cv-1853) 
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones III 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 12, 2011 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, FUENTES, and GARTH, Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 22, 2011) 
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Raymond J. Rigat, Esq. 
Two Penn Center Plaza, Suite 200 
1500 JFK Boulevard 
Philadelphia, PA 19102-1706 
 Counsel for Appellant Eddie Wilson 
 
Stephen R. Cerutti II, Esq. 
Office of the United States Attorney 
228 Walnut Street, 2nd Floor 
Harrisburg, PA 17108-1754 
 Counsel for Appellees United States Parole 
Commission and Jonathan C. Miner 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge. 
 Petitioner-appellant Eddie Wilson appeals from the 
District Court‟s denial of his habeas petition.  Wilson is 
currently detained in a federal facility located in West 
Virginia and is serving an aggregate sentence comprised of 
sentences that were imposed under the D.C. Code and the 
U.S. Code.
1
  At the time of filing his petition, Wilson was 
                                              
 
1
  The D.C. Code permits “the Attorney General of the 
United States [to] assign a defendant sentenced to prison for a 
violation of the D.C.Code to . . . a federal facility,” and “if a 
prisoner assigned to a federal facility is serving sentences for 
both U.S. and D.C.Code offenses, the Bureau of Prisons is 
required to aggregate his various terms of imprisonment into 
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a single sentence for administrative purposes” pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3584.   Boone v. Menifee, 387 F. Supp. 2d 338, 346 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).  The resulting method for calculating parole 
is unique, as the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia explained in a proceeding related to this case: 
  
 When the Commission 
considers for parole “prisoners 
serving any combination of U.S. 
and D.C. Code sentences that 
have been aggregated by the U.S. 
Bureau of Prisons” (BOP), the 
Commission is directed by 
regulation to “apply the guidelines 
at [28 C.F.R.] § 2.20 to the 
prisoner‟s U.S. Code crimes, and 
the guidelines of the District of 
Columbia Board of Parole to the 
prisoner's D.C. Code crimes.” 28 
C.F.R. § 2.65(a)-(b) (2010).  
Although the process is thus 
bifurcated, parole consideration is 
nonetheless made “on the basis of 
a single parole eligibility and 
mandatory release date on the 
aggregate sentence” and “every 
decision made by the 
Commission, including the grant, 
denial, and revocation of parole, 
is made on the basis of the 
aggregate sentence.”  Id. § 
2.65(a). 
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incarcerated in a federal penitentiary in Allenwood, 
Pennsylvania. 
 
 In his petition, Wilson alleged that respondent-appellee 
the United States Parole Commission (Commission) had 
violated his constitutional rights under the Due Process and 
Ex Post Facto Clauses by denying him parole and refusing to 
set a presumptive release date.  We hold that Wilson must 
obtain a Certificate of Appealability (COA) to proceed with 
this appeal, and we deny his request for issuance of such a 
Certificate.  Accordingly, we will dismiss Wilson‟s appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
 
I. 
 
 In 1977, Wilson was convicted of first-degree murder 
and armed assault in the Superior Court of the District of 
Columbia.  He was sentenced to a term of twenty-eight years 
to life imprisonment under the D.C. Code.  In 1987, while 
serving his D.C. Code sentence in a federal facility, Wilson 
was convicted for possession with intent to distribute a 
Schedule IV controlled substance in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
4205, for which he received a three-year sentence.  He was 
also found not guilty of a corresponding charge for possession 
of a knife.  In 2001, Wilson‟s D.C. Code sentence was 
aggregated with his U.S. Code sentence in accordance with 
Chatman-Bey v. Meese, 797 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1986), 
                                                                                                     
 
Wilson v. Fullwood, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2011 WL 1113361, 
at *2 (D.D.C. 2011) (footnote omitted ).   
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vacated on other grounds, 864 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
2
  
Since 2003, Wilson has been engaged in litigation 
                                              
 
2
  Chatman-Bey prescribed the mechanics of 
aggregation as follows : 
 
Whether consecutive sentences 
are imposed solely under the U.S. 
Code, or under the federal Code 
and the D.C. Code, all should be 
added together to arrive at a single 
aggregate sentence.  But because 
the D.C. Code “otherwise 
provides,” the 10-year cap [on 
parole ineligibility] indicated in 
18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) [is] not . . . 
dispositive when a D.C. Code 
sentence is implicated.  Rather, 
the prisoner . . . remain[s] 
ineligible for parole until he 
complete[s] service of time 
equivalent to the minimum D.C. 
Code sentence or sentences.   
 
. . .  
 
. . . [W]e hold that 1) the same full 
aggregation approach must be 
used in calculating the parole 
eligibility date of persons 
incarcerated in federal 
penitentiaries, whether under U.S. 
Code sentences or both U.S. Code 
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challenging the Commission‟s determinations concerning his 
parole.
 3
  
 
 Wilson, acting pro se, filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition 
with the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania on September 20, 2006.  He alleged that the 
Commission had 1) violated his due process rights in 2004 
and 2005 by arbitrarily denying him parole and by retaliating 
for his success in prior litigation to have certain disciplinary 
enhancements removed, and 2) violated the U.S. 
Constitution‟s Ex Post Facto Clause by failing to set a parole-
release date within his guidelines range, as required under the 
version of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) in effect when 
his U.S. Code sentence was imposed.  
 
 While the petition was pending before the District 
Court, on June 3, 2008, the Commission again denied Wilson 
                                                                                                     
and D.C. Code sentences, but that 
2) persons sentenced for D.C. 
Code offenses must serve time at 
least equal to the minimum D.C. 
Code term or terms before they 
may be considered for parole. 
 
797 F.2d at 993-94. 
   
 
3
  We have summarized the remainder of Wilson‟s 
background information in an earlier stage of these 
proceedings.  Wilson v. Reilly, 163 F. App‟x 122 (3d Cir. 
2006).  We include here only those facts that are germane to 
this appeal. 
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parole and scheduled a reconsideration hearing for April 
2011.  
 
 By memorandum and order dated February 11, 2010, 
the District Court denied the petition, reasoning that 1) the 
Commission had a rational basis for denying Wilson parole 
(i.e., the “unusual circumstances” of his offenses) and 2) 
Wilson was not entitled to benefit from the release-date 
guarantee under the earlier version of the SRA because the 
Commission applied D.C. Code regulations, not the current 
SRA, in declining to set a parole date.  The District Court also 
denied Wilson‟s request for a COA, explaining that a 
petitioner who is in custody “by virtue of a District of 
Columbia” judgment is considered a state prisoner needing a 
COA, and that Wilson had not made the threshold showing 
for issuance of such a Certificate.   
 
 Wilson requested a COA from this Court under 28 
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).  On October 26, 2010, this Court 
referred the request to a merits panel, appointed counsel for 
Wilson, and instructed that, “[i]n addition to the merits of the 
appeal, counsel for appellant is directed to address the 
question of whether a [COA] is required for this appeal, to the 
extent that the habeas petition challenges a parole decision 
regarding a federal sentence.” 
 
II. 
 
 As a “jurisdictional prerequisite” to appealing from a 
denial of a habeas petition, a state prisoner “must first seek 
and obtain a COA from a circuit justice or judge.”  Miller-El 
v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003); see also Morris v. 
Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 1999) (“A habeas petitioner 
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seeking to appeal must obtain a [COA] in order for the court 
of appeals to have jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)).  
Congress established the COA requirement as “[t]he primary 
means of separating meritorious from frivolous appeals” that 
would “delay[] the States‟ ability to impose sentences.”  
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892-93 (1983).  The COA 
requirement is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides 
in relevant part: 
 
Unless a circuit justice or judge 
issues a certificate of 
appealability, an appeal may not 
be taken to the court of appeals 
from-- 
 
(A) the final order in a 
habeas corpus proceeding 
in which the detention 
complained of arises out of 
process issued by a State 
court; or 
 
(B) the final order in a 
proceeding under section 
2255 [for correcting 
erroneous sentences]. 
 
Id. § 2253(c)(1).  The question here is whether Wilson‟s 
detention pursuant to his aggregated D.C. Code/U.S. Code 
sentence (hereafter “mixed sentence”) “arises out of process 
issued by a State court.” 
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 It is settled law that “a court of the District [of 
Columbia] is a state court for purposes of section 2253(c),” 
and thus “a prisoner arrested or convicted pursuant to process 
or judgment of the courts of the District must obtain a COA.”  
Madley v. U.S. Parole Comm‟n, 278 F.3d 1306, 1308, 1310 
(D.C. Cir. 2002).  As the D.C. Circuit observed in Madley, 
  
The federal seat of government is 
constitutionally different from the 
states, but Congress has created a 
trial and appellate court system of 
general jurisdiction for the 
District separate from the United 
States courts (of which we are a 
part) and intended to serve the 
District in much the same manner 
as the court systems of the various 
states and other large municipal 
entities. 
 
Id. at 1308.  In several non-precedential opinions, this Court 
has repeatedly endorsed Madley‟s holding that a prisoner 
incarcerated for D.C. Code violations is considered a state 
prisoner who must obtain a COA.  See, e.g., Robinson v. 
Reilly, 340 F. App‟x 772, 773 (3d Cir. 2009); Graves v. Holt, 
303 F. App‟x 121, 123 (3d Cir. 2008); Keitt v. U.S. Parole 
Comm‟n, 238 F. App‟x 755, 758 (3d Cir. 2007).  We again 
hold, in light of Madley, that prisoners serving D.C. Code 
offenses must obtain a COA to appeal denial of their habeas 
petitions.
4
  
                                              
 
4
  The D.C. Court of Appeals‟ decision in Taylor v. 
Washington, 808 A.2d 770 (D.C. 2002), does not undercut 
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 The more complex question -- and one for which we 
have not found direct precedent -- is whether a petitioner such 
as Wilson, whose D.C. Code sentence was aggregated with 
his U.S. Code sentence, is still considered to be subject to 
detention that “arises out of process issued by a State court” 
for the purposes of § 2253(c)(1)(A)‟s COA requirement.  We 
conclude that the aggregation of Wilson‟s D.C. Code 
sentence with his U.S. Code sentence, which Wilson received 
while serving his D.C. Code sentence, does not alter our 
analysis under § 2253(c)(1).    
 
  In Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 
2001), we held that a state prisoner objecting to a decision by 
the parole board must obtain a COA because he was 
challenging “his continued detention, which resulted initially 
from a state court judgment.”  Even though the parole board‟s 
decision was “neither „process‟ nor „issued by a State court,‟” 
we looked to the underlying basis for the prisoner‟s initial 
detention to determine whether a COA was necessary.  Id.   
                                                                                                     
Madley‟s reasoning.  The holding of Taylor -- that D.C. 
courts have no jurisdiction to entertain certain D.C. Code 
offenders‟ habeas petitions, according to the D.C. Code‟s 
habeas provision, id. at 772-73 -- signaled only that D.C. 
courts do not mirror state courts in every respect, a fact which 
the Madley court had already acknowledged.  See Madley, 
278 F.3d at 1308.  Indeed, Madley emphasized that the 
question of whether statutory reference to a “State” 
encompasses the District of Columbia depends on the 
particular statute, and held that in the context of § 2253(c)(1), 
the term “State” includes the District of Columbia.  Id. 
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 Other courts of appeals that have considered the same 
issue have similarly construed § 2253(c)(1)(A)‟s COA 
requirement as pivoting on whether the initial basis for the 
detention complained was a State court judgment or process, 
even when the prisoner is only challenging a decision of the 
prison board.  Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1063 
(11th Cir. 2003); Madley, 278 F.3d at 1310; Greene v. Tenn. 
Dep‟t of Corr., 265 F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir. 2001); Montez v. 
McKinna, 208 F.3d 863, 869 (10th Cir. 2000); see also 
Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 553-54 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Swarthout v. 
Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859 (2011).  But see Walker v. O‟Brien, 
216 F.3d 626, 638 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding COA was not 
required because “prisoner‟s administrative detention” was 
not “something that arises from process issued by the state 
court”). 
 
 Although Coady and cases of its ilk interpreted the 
language of § 2253(c)(1)(A) in a slightly different context -- 
specifically, in determining whether prison-board 
administrative decisions “arose out of process issued by a 
State court” -- their approach informs the inquiry here.  In 
determining whether a COA is required under § 
2253(c)(1)(A), a court must ask whether the prisoner‟s 
detention originated from a state court conviction and/or 
sentence, even when the prisoner is objecting to a subsequent 
disciplinary or parole-related decision that is distinct from the 
judgment of conviction.  
   
 In view of Coady‟s construction of § 2253(c)(1)(A), 
we hold that Wilson was required to obtain a COA before this 
court could entertain his habeas petition.  The reason for 
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Wilson‟s initial detention was the judgment of conviction 
issued by a D.C. court, which, as discussed above, is 
considered “process issued by a State court” pursuant to § 
2253(c)(1)(A).  Wilson committed, and was sentenced for, his 
U.S. Code violation while imprisoned for his D.C. Code 
offenses -- meaning that, for the purposes of our analysis, his 
federal offense and sentence “arose out” of his D.C. 
sentence.
5
   Similarly, the Commission‟s refusals to grant 
                                              
 
5
  That said, we reject the Government‟s 
characterization of a mixed sentence as arising exclusively 
out of D.C. (and thus, state) process for the purposes of § 
2253.  The Government, citing Chatman-Bey, argues that a 
mixed sentence effectively operates as a D.C. Code sentence, 
and thus, “Wilson‟s current incarceration must be viewed as 
purely a result of his D.C. Code 28 years-to-life sentence.”  
(Gov‟t‟s Br. at 21.)  In Chatman-Bey, the D.C. Circuit held 
that the D.C. Code and U.S. Code sentences of a prisoner 
detained in a federal facility should be treated as a single 
aggregate sentence, but that in calculating the prisoner‟s 
parole eligibility date, the prisoner would need to serve the 
minimum term prescribed for his D.C. Code offense -- no 
matter how long -- despite the U.S. Code mandate that the 
prisoner be parole-eligible after ten years.  797 F.2d at 993-
94.   
 
 Since Chatman-Bey, numerous authorities have 
emphasized -- contrary to the Government‟s position here -- 
that mixed sentences are not simply treated as D.C. Code 
sentences; rather, their hybridity is preserved.  E.g., Thomas 
v. Brennan, 961 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[W]hatever 
aggregation means, it is partial rather than complete . . . [T]he 
Commission must apply D.C. parole regulations to the D.C. 
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Wilson parole and to set a parole release date -- whether 
viewed as decisions related to just Wilson‟s D.C. Code 
sentence or to both his D.C. Code and U.S. Code sentences -- 
are determinations incident to Wilson‟s continuing detention 
for his original D.C. Code offense, and thus, “aris[e] out of  
process issued by State court.”6  As a consequence, Wilson 
needs a COA to sustain his appeal. 
                                                                                                     
portion of mixed sentences and federal parole regulations to 
the federal portion.”); id. at 618.  
 
 Thus, it is clear that the U.S. Code component of a 
mixed sentence is not subsumed by its corresponding D.C. 
Code component.  Instead, a mixed sentence,  which is 
partially governed by federal parole regulations, is clearly 
distinct from -- not equivalent to -- a pure D.C. Code 
sentence.  By the same token, the converse position that 
Wilson espouses -- that a mixed sentence‟s D.C. Code 
component is swallowed by its U.S. Code component -- is 
likewise untenable. 
 
 
6
  Wilson concedes as much in his appellate brief, 
relating that he is “in custody by virtue of a District of 
Columbia judgment.” (Appellant‟s Br. at 6.).  Additionally, it 
is  telling that when the Commission offered reasons for 
denying Wilson‟s parole in 2004 and 2005 -- the decisions 
that Wilson challenges in his petition -- it referred exclusively 
to his D.C. court convictions, without once mentioning his 
U.S. Code violation.  (A61-64, 67-71.) 
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III. 
 
 In deciding whether to issue a COA, we review a 
habeas petition to determine whether the “petitioner has made 
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 
meaning that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for 
that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved 
in a different manner or that the issues presented were 
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” 
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Wilson alleges violations of his 
constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause and Ex 
Post Facto Clause. 
 
A. 
 
 Wilson‟s due process claim is premised on his 
allegation that the Commission denied his parole in 2004 and 
again in 2005 for arbitrary and vindictive reasons.  
Specifically, he alleges that even though the Commission 
found in 2001 that “a decision outside the Total Guidelines 
range . . . is not warranted” (meaning that he could be parole-
eligible within his guidelines range), it altered its stance in 
2004, recommending that Wilson‟s parole-eligibility date 
should be above the guidelines range since he was “a more 
serious risk” than the base offense score for his 1975 crimes 
indicated.  The Commission ratified the 2004 finding in its 
2005 decision to deny Wilson parole.  Wilson argues that the 
shift in argument for denying him parole evinces that the 
Commission was inventing reasons to justify his continued 
detention, and suggests that the Commission acted in 
retaliation for his success in getting his disciplinary 
enhancements removed through litigation. 
 15 
 
 
 Wilson‟s due process claim fails, substantially for the 
reasons expressed by the District Court.  The Commission 
had found in 2001 that Wilson “poses a more serious risk” 
due to the violent nature of his offenses.  At that time, the 
Commission determined that a parole-eligibility date above 
the guidelines range was not warranted only because Wilson 
had not yet reached his minimum guideline range -- at which 
point his parole date could be “better assessed” -- and not 
because he was perceived as anything other than a serious 
parole risk.  
 
  In 2004, once Wilson had served the minimum 
guidelines term, the Commission was in a suitable position to 
gauge Wilson‟s eligibility for parole, and concluded, 
consistent with its 2001 finding of risk, that parole within the 
Guidelines range was inappropriate. It reached that decision  
on the basis of the relevant D.C. Code criteria for setting a 
parole date above the guidelines for “[m]ore serious parole 
risks[],” e.g., his “[u]nusual cruelty to the victim” (he 
kidnapped and raped female victims -- one a minor -- and 
sodomized a male victim with a lightbulb) and “[u]nusual 
propensity to inflict unprovoked and potentially homicidal 
violence” (he was involved in two murders).   See 28 C.F.R. § 
2.80(n)(2)(ii)(C)-(D).   
 
 Accordingly, the 2004 and 2005 decisions to deny 
parole, which the Commission reached upon considering the 
germane parole factors, were neither arbitrary nor capricious.  
Nor, for that matter, can the decisions  be construed as 
vindictive, since Wilson‟s disciplinary enhancements were 
removed only after the Commission issued its 2004 decision, 
which the 2005 decision mirrored in all relevant respects.  As 
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such, Wilson has not made a substantial showing that the 
Commission violated his due process rights.  
 
B. 
 
 Wilson also alleges that the Commission violated the 
Ex Post Facto Clause by denying him a parole-release date 
within his guidelines range, as required under the version of § 
235(b)(3) of the SRA that was in effect when his U.S. Code 
sentence was imposed.  In Lyons v. Mendez, 303 F.3d 285, 
293 (3d Cir. 2002), we held that prisoners who committed 
U.S. Code crimes between the time of the SRA‟s enactment 
in 1984 and § 235(b)(3)‟s amendment in 1987 were entitled 
to parole release date within the guidelines range, even 
though the 1987 amendment authorized the Commission to 
set release dates beyond the guidelines range.  We specified 
that “the retroactive application of the 1987 amendment to 
lengthen [the appellant‟s] punishment was unconstitutional 
under the ex post facto clause.”  Id. at 292. 
 
 Here, as the District Court properly noted, the 
Commission did not rely on the post-1987 version of the SRA 
to deny Wilson a parole date within the guidelines range.  
Rather, the Commission applied the relevant D.C. Code 
parole guidelines, which -- both at the time of the parole 
hearings and at the time that Wilson‟s D.C. Code sentence 
was imposed -- vested the overseeing parole board with 
discretion to set a parole date above the guidelines range.  See 
Wilson, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2011 WL 1113361, at *3-5.  
The Commission appropriately considered only the D.C. 
Board of Parole criteria, as opposed to the SRA‟s parole 
provisions for U.S. Code sentences, because Wilson was 
considered “D.C. Parole Eligible.” 28 C.F.R. § 2.65(b), (e).  
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As the Commission had no occasion to consider whether 
parole was appropriate under the SRA, Wilson‟s ex post facto 
claim resting on Lyons cannot be sustained.  
 
IV. 
 
 We hold that Wilson was required to obtain a COA 
before his appeal could be heard, and that he has not made the 
necessary showing of constitutional violations that would 
justify issuance of a COA.  Therefore, we deny his request for 
a COA and dismiss his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  
